Disfluent fonts do not help people to solve math and non-math problems regardless of their numeracy by Sirota, M et al.








Disfluent fonts do not help people to solve math and non-math problems regardless of their 
numeracy  
 
Miroslav Sirota, Andriana Theodoropoulou & Marie Juanchich 




Author Note  
This manuscript was accepted for publication in Thinking & Reasoning. This postprint might 
differ from the published version. 
 
Correspondence concerning this paper should be addressed to Miroslav Sirota, Department 
of Psychology, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park, Colchester, CO4 3SQ, United Kingdom.  
Email: msirota@essex.ac.uk, Phone: (+44) 1206 874 229. 
All data sets, R code and materials used in this research are available at https://osf.io/g65yj/. 
The preregistration protocol is available at https://aspredicted.org/rd5zj.pdf 
Thanks to Andrew Meyer for sharing the data published in Meyer et al. (2015). 
  




Prior research has suggested that perceptual disfluency activates analytical processing and 
increases the solution rate of mathematical problems with appealing but incorrect answers 
(i.e., the Cognitive Reflection Test, hereafter CRT). However, a recent meta-analysis does 
not support such a conclusion. We tested here whether insufficient numerical ability can 
account for this discrepancy. We found strong evidence against the disfluency effect on the 
problem-solving rate for the Numerical CRT problems regardless of participants’ numeracy 
and for the Verbal CRT non-math problems (n = 310, Exp. 1) even though simple 
instructions to pay attention to and reflect upon the Verbal CRT problems substantially 
increased their solution rate (n = 311, Exp. 2). The updated meta-analysis (k = 18) yielded 
close-to-zero effect, Hedge’s g = -0.01, 95% CI[-0.05, 0.03] and decisive evidence against the 
disfluency effect on math problems, BF0+ = 151.6. Thus, perceptual disfluency does not 
activate analytical processing. 
Keywords: Cognitive Reflection Test, Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test, disfluent font, numeracy, 
fluency 
  
Running Head: DISFLUENCY EFFECT ON COGNITIVE REFLECTION 
3 
 
Dual-process theories of cognition postulate two types of cognitive processes: 
intuitive processes typically described as fast, automatic and frugal, and analytical processes 
typically described as slow, effortful and reflective (e.g., Darlow & Sloman, 2010; Evans, 
2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Reyna, 2004; Sloman, 1996). 
Dual-process theories have successfully accounted for various psychological effects in 
judgment and decision-making, deductive and inductive reasoning, moral reasoning and 
beliefs (e.g., Frederick, 2005; Liberali, Reyna, Furlan, Stein, & Pardo, 2012; Pennycook, 
Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015; Sirota & Juanchich, 2018; Sirota, Juanchich, & Hagmayer, 2014; 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011, 2014). The recent theoretical discussion has focused on 
the mechanisms of activation of the analytical process (e.g., a serial or parallel activation 
model) and which cues can trigger them (e.g., Bhatia, 2017; De Neys, 2012 for a review).  
In respect to this research problem, prior research has suggested that meta-cognitive 
difficulty—the subjective experience of ease or difficulty associated with processing 
information—might be one of the mechanisms triggering analytical processing when solving 
problems (Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley, & Eyre, 2007; Oppenheimer, 2008). In the absence of 
other cues, a feeling of ease associated with processing information will trigger more 
intuitive processing, whereas a feeling of meta-cognitive difficulty will trigger more 
systematic, analytical thinking. Some previous studies tested this idea by manipulating 
perceptual (dis-)fluency: presenting problems in a fluent (i.e., easy-to-read) font and a 
disfluent (i.e., difficult-to-read) font. This manipulation relied on the idea that the difficulty 
associated with reading a problem printed in the disfluent font would be substituted for the 
meta-cognitive difficulty of the problem itself: as in “if it is hard to read, it must be hard to 
solve”. For instance, Alter et al. (2007), presented participants with three mathematical 
problems that had appealing intuitive but incorrect answers, known as the Cognitive 
Reflection Test, (Frederick, 2005) either in a fluent or disfluent font. The participants 
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correctly solved more problems in the disfluent font condition than in the fluent font 
condition. According to the authors, the participants reading the problems in the disfluent 
font adopted a more systematic processing strategy, which resulted in improved 
performance. Thus, meta-cognitive experiences of disfluency served as a signal that the 
initially generated judgment was insufficient and that more elaborate systematic thinking was 
necessary (Alter et al., 2007). 
However, several studies did not replicate the effect of disfluency on the solution 
rate of the three mathematical problems (Meyer et al., 2015; Thompson et al., 2013). A 
meta-analysis of the original study from Alter et al. (2007) and 16 subsequent replication 
studies found no overall disfluency effect on performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Meyer et al., 2015). None of the replication studies found a statistically significant disfluency 
effect. In theory, two main explanations could be considered for a possible discrepancy 
between the original study and the lack of disfluency effect reported in the replication 
studies.  
The first explanation could be that either the original study or the set of replication 
studies do not adequately represent the actual population-level disfluency effect (or lack of 
it). It might be that the original study reported a false-positive finding (Type I error) or it 
might be that the subsequent replications reported false-negative findings (Type II error). 
The false-negative findings explanation can hardly be considered a plausible explanation: 
7,327 participants amassed in the 16 studies would be sufficient to detect any reasonably 
small effect (i.e., d = 0.1 or bigger) with extraordinary statistical power (.99 or more with 
the increasing effect size). However, the false-positive finding of the original study remains 
quite possible. Supporting this possibility, Meyer et al. (2015) noted that, in the original 
study, the difference in performance between the disfluent and fluent font groups (each 
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having 20 people) was driven solely by the unusually low performance of the widget 
problem in the fluent font condition (4 out of 20 responses vs 16 out of 20 responses in the 
disfluent font condition). No difference was observed between the disfluent and fluent fonts 
in the bat and ball problem and the lily pad problem (16/20 vs 15/20, 18/20 vs 18/20, 
respectively). This means that sampling variation solely could explain the discrepant findings.  
The second explanation for the discrepant findings could be the existence of hidden 
moderators. For instance, the authors of the original study suggested that cognitive ability 
might play a role: disfluency might benefit only those with high cognitive ability (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, & Epley, 2013). Indeed, some limited evidence suggested that this might be 
the case: only the participants with higher intelligence benefited from the disfluent 
manipulation in terms of enhanced performance (Thompson et al., 2013). However, the 
recent meta-analysis did not lend support to this possibility (Meyer et al., 2015). The 
authors provided several arguments against it: most notably, they showed that intelligence—
measured either by selected items from Raven’s Progressive Matrices or by self-reported 
SAT math scores—did not interact with the font manipulation to predict enhanced 
performance in the Cognitive Reflection Test (Meyer et al., 2015). Also, the disfluency effect 
was not moderated by the experimental setting (in public, in a lab or online), presentation 
format (paper and pencil vs computer screen) and previous exposure to the problems 
(Meyer et al., 2015). Finally, it can be argued that the negligible amount of heterogeneity 
between the studies does not warrant an exhaustive search for hidden moderators (Meyer 
et al., 2015). 
Nevertheless, we believe that one additional moderator should be considered. One 
obvious candidate—a distinct ability required to solve the Cognitive Reflection Test, which 
is conceptually and operationally different from cognitive ability—is numeracy. Indeed, prior 
research found that solving the CRT requires numerical skills over and above cognitive 
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abilities (Liberali et al., 2012; Pennycook & Ross, 2016; Sinayev & Peters, 2015; Sirota, 
Kostovičová, Juanchich, Dewberry, & Marshall, 2018). The Cognitive Reflection Test has 
been used widely to measure the extent to which people rely on analytical processing (e.g., 
Pennycook & Rand, 2018, 2019), but it has also been widely criticised for measuring 
numeracy (e.g., Sinayev & Peters, 2015). This implies that the disfluent font (i) increases 
performance in the numerical version of the Cognitive Reflection Test only for those who 
have sufficient mathematical skills to benefit from the triggered analytical processing and (ii) 
increases performance in cognitive reflection problems that do not require numerical skills 
at all (e.g., Sirota et al., 2018). 
We found mixed evidence to support this moderating role of numeracy. On one 
hand, perceptual disfluency enhanced the solution rate of the problems that did not require 
any numerical skills, but which were similar to those featured in the CRT in terms of 
offering an intuitive but incorrect first answer; for example, oversight problems such as the 
Moses illusion (Song & Schwarz, 2008) and the belief-bias syllogism (Alter et al., 2007). On 
the other hand, however, three pieces of evidence warrant some pessimism. First, some 
subsequent studies failed to replicate the effect of disfluency on non-numeric problems 
(Meyer et al., 2015; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; Thompson et al., 2013), which might be 
because the original studies have their own methodological and analytical limitations (e.g., 
not correcting for multiple comparisons; excluding some items due to the floor/ceiling 
effect). Second, Meyer et al. (2015) described an unpublished study in which the font 
manipulation did not affect the solution rate of those participants who successfully solved 
the problem in the second round once they received a hint about the incorrect intuitive 
response. This means that the font manipulation did not affect the performance of those 
people who had sufficient mathematical skills to solve the problem since they managed to 
solve it in the second round. Finally, self-reported SAT math scores were not found to 
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moderate the disfluent font effect of the numerical problems across five different studies. 
This is strong evidence against numeracy as a moderator, but still needs to be replicated 
with an objective measure of numeracy, which would circumvent possible issues with 
inflated self-reported SAT scores (Cassady, 2001; Shepperd, 1993). Hence, this mixed 
evidence warrants further investigation of numeracy as a possible moderator of the 
disfluency effect on solving CRT problems, while measuring numeracy objectively, and of the 
disfluency effect on cognitive reflection problems that do not require any numerical skills—
the verbal CRT (Sirota et al., 2018).   
The Present Research 
In the manuscript presented here, we aimed to test the effect of perceptual 
disfluency on cognitive reflection, while testing possible boundary conditions of the 
disfluency effect. Specifically, we made three advancements. First, we measured the 
numerical skills using the objective performance rather than the self-reported performance 
in a standard numeracy test (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001). Second, we measured cognitive 
reflection using an extended version of the Numerical Cognitive Reflection Test, which 
contains the three critical items of the original version of the CRT, but also four additional 
items (Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014). The extended version of the CRT has better 
statistical and psychometric properties, which makes it more likely to detect an effect since 
it has better score variability and internal consistency (Toplak et al., 2014). Finally, we also 
measured cognitive reflection using the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test, which features 
problems that involve cognitive reflection but do not require any mathematical calculations 
(Sirota et al., 2018).  
We derived three main hypotheses from the assumption that the disfluency effect 
exists. First, according to a strong version of the assumption that the disfluency effect exists 
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and operates independently from numeracy, we can expect that the disfluent font will 
increase the performance in the Numerical Cognitive Reflection Test compared with the 
fluent font (Hypothesis 1, Experiment 1). We expected, given the overwhelming evidence 
demonstrating the lack of the disfluency effect, that this hypothesis would not be confirmed. 
According to a weaker version of the assumption that the disfluency effect exists, the 
disfluent font triggers analytical processing but will manifest only when participants have 
sufficient numerical skills to solve the problems. We derived two hypotheses from this 
version of the assumption. First, disfluency will increase performance in the Numerical 
Cognitive Reflection Test, but only for those who have enough numeracy skills to solve the 
mathematical problems (Hypothesis 2, Experiment 1). Second, disfluency will increase 
performance in the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test, since it does not require any 
mathematical skills (Hypothesis 3, Experiment 1). This last hypothesis hinges on the 
assumption that increased analytical processing translates into increased performance in the 
Verbal CRT. To test this assumption, we designed a new experiment in which we asked 
people explicitly to pay more attention to and reflect upon the tricky verbal problems. We 
expected that this explicit warning about the problems requiring reflection would elicit a 
higher solution rate in the Verbal CRT compared with the standard instructions (Hypothesis 
4, Experiment 2). 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 312 psychology undergraduate students 
from the University of Essex in exchange for course credits. The sample size was based on 
an a-priori stopping rule to reach a minimal sample size of 300 participants—comprising a 
sample of 296 participants required to detect a medium effect size, Cohen’s d = 0.50 for an 
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independent samples t-test with high power (α = .05, 1 - β = .99 for a two-sided test) and 
an additional 4 students to account for attrition rate (Cohen, 1988). We collected data from 
slightly more students because we let all the students who had signed up for the study 
participate. We excluded one participant due to an error in materials (i.e., having two 
Verbal CRTs instead of one Verbal and one Numerical CRT) and one participant due to a 
failure to fulfil the eligibility criteria (i.e., reported age of 17 years old). The resulting sample 
size of 310 allowed us to detect a small effect size (Cohen’s d = 0.32), while using an 
independent samples t-test and assuming α = .05, 1 - β = .80, and a two-sided test (Cohen, 
1988). The achieved statistical power of the test was approximating 1.0 for the originally 
reported effect, Cohen’s d = 0.71 (Alter et al., 2007). Hence, this was a sufficient sample size 
to assess the effect. Participants were mostly women (79.9%). The participants’ ages ranged 
from 18 to 43 years (M = 19.4, SD = 2.2 years).  
Participants solved the word problems from the Numerical Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014) and the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test 
(counterbalanced for order) either in a fluent, easy-to-read font (i.e., black Myriad Web 12-
point font) or in a disfluent, difficult-to-read font (i.e., 10% grey italicised Myriad Web 10-
point font)—the same manipulation that was used in the original study (Alter et al., 2007). 
Thus, we had a 2(font: fluent font vs disfluent font) × 2(CRT: Numerical vs Verbal) mixed-
subjects design, with the font as a between-subjects factor and the CRT as a within-subjects 
factor with a counterbalanced order of presentation. We conducted a manipulation check 
on a separate sample of 20 participants from the same pool who rated the extent to which 
the same text (i.e., CRT questions) printed in the two fonts was easy/hard to read using a 5-
point Likert scale (anchored as 1: extremely easy to read, 5: extremely hard to read). The 
counterbalanced presentation order of the two texts did not significantly alter the ratings 
for the fluent or disfluent font, t(18) = 0, p = 1.000, Cohen’s d = 0; t(18) = 0.75, p = .461, 
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Cohen’s d = 0.34, respectively; hence, it was not considered further. Similar to the prior 
reported research, the fluent font (M = 1.2, SD = 0.4) compared with the disfluent font (M 
= 3.7, SD = 1.2) was judged to be substantially and statistically significantly easier to read, 
t(19) = -8.75, p < .001, Cohen’s d = -1.96. The manipulation was thus very effective. 
Materials and procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were instructed 
to turn their phones off and were allocated to an individual booth without access to a 
computer or the internet. This was done to prevent the participants from searching online 
for the answers to the problems. Participants then solved the problems of the Numerical 
CRT or the Verbal CRT (depending on the random order) in a paper-and-pencil format. We 
used the extended 7-item version of the Numerical CRT (Toplak et al., 2014) for its good 
psychometric and statistical properties. It comprised the original three CRT items 
(Frederick, 2005) and four additional items (Toplak et al., 2014). A summation score 
(ranging from 0 to 7, transformed into a 0–100% scale for ease of comparison with the 
Verbal CRT performance) had an acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.74); 
higher scores indicated more cognitive reflection. We used the 10-item version of the 
Verbal CRT (Sirota et al., 2018) requiring cognitive reflection while solving word problems 
that do not involve mathematical calculations (e.g., “Mary’s father has 5 daughters but no 
sons – Nana, Nene, Nini, Nono. What is the fifth daughter’s name probably?”). A 
summation score (ranging from 0 to 10, transformed into a 0–100% scale) had a good 
internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.83); higher scores indicated more cognitive 
reflection.  
Participants then answered numerical ability items using Lipkus et al.’s Numeracy 
Scale, a very common measure of numerical ability (Lipkus et al., 2001). It consists of 11 
simple mathematical word problems that require an understanding of basic probability 
concepts, the ability to convert percentages to proportions, and the ability to compare 
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different risk magnitudes (e.g., “If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten 
years, and person B’s risk is double that of A’s, what is B’s risk?”) (e.g., Liberali et al., 2012; 
Sirota et al., 2018). A summation score (ranging from 0 to 11) had a questionable internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.61) but similar to the one reported by prior research (e.g., 
Liberali et al., 2012; Sirota et al., 2018); a higher score indicated better numeracy. 
Finally, the participants answered socio-demographic questions about their age and 
gender and were debriefed. We conducted the study in accordance with the ethical 
standards of the University of Essex Ethics Committee and the APA ethical guidelines. We 
have reported all the experiments, measures, manipulations and exclusions. The data set, R 
code used for analysis and the materials used in this research are available on the Open 
Science Framework: https://osf.io/g65yj/.  
Results and Discussion 
Participants solved correctly, on average, 27.8% of the Numerical CRT problems1. 
They solved slightly more word problems in the fluent font compared with the disfluent font 
condition (Figure 1). Thus, the observed effect was in the opposite direction to the 
prediction of the disfluency effect hypothesis even though it was not statistically significant, 
t(308) = -0.39, p = .700, d = -0.04. Since not rejecting the null hypothesis does not logically 
entail accepting the null hypothesis, we quantified the evidence for the disfluency effect 
hypothesis relative to the null hypothesis that included the opposite direction effect using a 
Bayes factor analysis (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014; Morey & Rouder, 2015). We found strong 
evidence against the disfluency effect hypothesis, BF0+ = 10.5 (both using a default Cauchy 
                                                          
1We found no evidence for CRT presentation order effect on cognitive reflection, F(1, 306) 
= 2.76, p = .097, its interaction with the font, F(1, 306) = 1.10, p = .296 or with the type of 
CRT, F(1, 306) = 1.75, p = .186. Therefore, we did not consider the presentation order 
factor in further analyses.  
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prior of 0.707) while robustness analysis found similar results using different Cauchy prior 
widths (BF0+ = 14.8 for wide and BF0+ = 20.8 for ultra-wide priors). In addition, we checked 
the disfluency effect for individual CRT items (given that the effect was mostly driven by 
differences for one item in the original study), but we did not find any significant differences 
(Table 1). Thus, we found evidence against the disfluency effect hypothesis applied to 
mathematical CRT problems (Hypothesis 1). 
 
Figure 1: Effect of font and type of Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) on performance in cognitive 
reflection (in % of correctly solved problems—cognitive reflection score). 
Note. Horizontal lines represent means, boxes represent 95% confidence intervals, beans 
represent smoothed densities and circles represent individual responses.  
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Table 1 The effect of font manipulation on the number of correct responses (in %) for each 
problem in the Numerical Cognitive Reflection Test and the Verbal Cognitive Reflection 
Test. 
 
Correct responses  
(in %) 
 
Differences between the disfluent and 
fluent font 
 Disfluent font Fluent font  χ2 p φ 
Numerical CRT       
   NCRT 1 29.7 27.1  0.14 .706 -0.03 
   NCRT 2 27.7 27.7  <0.01 1.000 0.00 
   NCRT 3 29.7 31.6  0.06 .805 0.02 
   NCRT 4 14.8 22.6  2.57 .109 0.10 
   NCRT 5 14.2 14.2  <0.01 1.000 0.00 
   NCRT 6 33.5 27.1  1.24 .267 -0.07 
   NCRT 7 40.6 48.4  1.58 .209 0.08 
       
Verbal CRT       
   VCRT 1 19.4 21.3  0.08 .778 0.02 
   VCRT 2 65.8 72.3  1.22 .269 0.07 
   VCRT 3 65.2 78.7  6.39 .011 0.15 
   VCRT 4 60.6 68.4  1.71 .192 0.08 
   VCRT 5 68.4 75.5  1.60 .206 0.08 
   VCRT 6 42.6 48.4  0.83 .362 0.06 
   VCRT 7 41.3 46.5  0.61 .423 0.05 
   VCRT 8 45.2 45.2  <0.01 1.000 <0.01 
   VCRT 9 39.4 41.9  0.12 .729 0.03 
   VCRT 10 47.7 54.8  1.29 .256 0.07 
Note. Given the number of comparisons (n), the critical p-value (p) of the chi-squared test 
(χ2) was adjusted using the Bonferroni adjustment (α = .05/n)—for the Numerical CRT the 
critical value is p = .007 and for the Verbal CRT it is p = .005; φ indicates the phi-coefficient.    
Participants with higher numeracy performed substantially better with the CRT math 
problems than those with lower numeracy (r = 0.44), t(308) = 8.62, p < .001; for illustration 
purposes only: the lower numeracy group (median split)—with a numeracy score smaller 
than 9 out of 11—solved on average 18.5% of the problems, SD = 21.7% and the higher 
numeracy group—those with a numeracy score equal to 9 or more—solved on average 
37.9% of the problems, SD = 29.1%. This finding enabled us to persuasively test the second 
hypothesis that the disfluency effect is more pronounced in those with higher numeracy. 
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This was not the case. In a multiple linear regression model, we found no significant 
interaction between font and numeracy, b = 0.2, t = 0.11, p = .912. Using the Bayes factor 
framework, the model featuring only the main effects was preferred relative to the full 
model featuring the main effects and the interaction term, BF12 = 8.4 and the model featuring 
only numeracy was preferred relative to the full model, BF12 = 62.6. In other terms, we 
found substantive relative evidence against the interaction and very strong relative evidence 
against the effect of the font and its interaction with numeracy. Thus, we found evidence 
against the possibility that numeracy moderates the effect of disfluency on the numerical 
CRT (Hypothesis 2). 
Participants solved correctly, on average, 52.4% of the Verbal CRT problems. They 
solved slightly more word problems in the fluent font compared with the disfluent font 
(Figure 1). Thus, the observed effect was again in the opposite direction to the one 
predicted by the disfluency effect hypothesis. However, it was not statistically significant, 
t(308) = -1.69, p = .091, d = -0.19. Using a Bayes factor analysis, we found strong evidence 
against the disfluency effect hypothesis, BF0+ = 20.7 (both using a default Cauchy prior of 
0.707) while robustness analysis found similar results using different Cauchy prior widths 
(BF0+ = 29.1 for wide and BF0+ = 41.1 for ultra-wide priors). In addition, we tested the 
disfluency effect on individual items, but we did not find any significant differences (Table 1). 
Thus, even for the Verbal CRT, we found evidence against the disfluency hypothesis applied 
to non-mathematical problems tapping into cognitive reflection ability (Hypothesis 3). 
Finally, to probe the robustness of the analyses reported above, we used a two-way 
analysis of variance with the font as a between-subjects factor and the Cognitive Reflection 
Test as a within-subjects factor and the cognitive reflection performance as the dependent 
variable. We reached the same conclusion. Consistent with the previous observations and 
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tests, the main effect of the font was not statistically significant, F(1, 308) = 1.57, p = .210; 
the effect of the type of CRT was significant (with the problems of the Verbal CRT being 
easier), F(1, 308) = 207.49, p < .001 and the interaction with the font was not, F(1, 308) = 
1.77, p = .185. (Adding numeracy as a covariate into the model did not change the 
conclusions about the results.) 
Data Synthesis: Estimating the disfluency effect on cognitive reflection with 
math problems 
To update the meta-analytical disfluency effect on solving math problems reported 
by Meyer et al. (2015), we computed a meta-analysis across all published studies reported in 
Meyer et al. (2015) and the findings concerning the Numerical CRT reported here. We used 
a random-effects model as implemented in the R package ‘metafor’ (Viechtbauer, 2010). The 
overall effect was virtually zero, Hedge’s g = -0.01, 95% CI [-0.05, 0.03], z = -0.44, p = .661. 
We observed only minimal between-study heterogeneity in the effect sizes, τ2 < 0.01 
(Cochran’s Q test was not significant, Q(17) = 15.60, p = .553) that occurred due to 
sampling error variability alone, I2 = 0.01%. We also computed meta-analytical Bayes factors 
on the same datasets using the R package ‘BayesFactor’ (Morey & Rouder, 2015). We found 
decisive evidence against the disfluency effect, BF0+ = 151.6 (using JSZ Bayes priors with an 
rscale of 1) relative to the null effect and the opposite effect, while robustness analysis found 
similar results using different Cauchy prior widths (BF0+ = 107.2 for rscale = 0.707 and BF0+ = 
214.4 for rscale 1.414).   
Experiment 2 
In Experiment 1, we found evidence against the disfluency effect on the Numerical Cognitive 
Reflection Test in people with low and high numeracy. However, a critical part of this 
evidence relied on a new cognitive reflection measure that does not require any numerical 
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abilities—the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test. The null effect on the Verbal CRT might 
indicate either the authentic absence of the disfluency effect or a lack of sensitivity in our 
measure to detect it—perceptual disfluency might have triggered analytical processing but 
the measure was not sensitive enough to capture its effect. To disentangle these two 
interpretations, in a pre-registered experiment, we conducted a positive control check of 
this new instrument following the recommendation of Alter et al. (2013) to test whether 
explicit instructions to be analytical improves accuracy in the task. In the experimental 
condition, we instructed participants to pay attention and direct their mental effort to the 
problems to solve them accurately. In the control condition, we used standard instructions. 
As a manipulation check, we expected that the participants in the experimental condition 
would spend more time on the problems than the participants in the control condition. We 
hypothesised that the participants in the experimental condition would be more likely to 
solve the verbal problems correctly than the participants in the control condition 
(Hypothesis 4).  
 
Method 
Participants and design. We recruited 311 participants from an online panel (Prolific 
Academic) who were invited to complete a short study in exchange for financial 
compensation (the average reward per hour was £7.16). The sample size was based on an a-
priori stopping rule to reach a minimal sample size of 310 participants with an identical 
power consideration to Experiment 1. Participants were eligible to take part only if they had 
a minimal 90% approval rate in previous studies, did not participate in the previous studies 
using the Verbal CRT run by our lab, their first language was English, they were UK 
nationals and were at least 18 years old. Three participants were automatically timed out by 
the recruiting system, and we did not exclude any participants from the rest of the sample. 
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Participants were women (65.0%), men (34.7%) or of other gender identity (0.3%). Their 
ages ranged from 18 to 74 years (M = 38.3, SD = 13.2 years).  
In a between-subjects design, participants solved five word problems selected from 
the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test following standard instructions (control condition) or 
instructions to be analytical (experimental condition).  
Materials and procedure. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly 
allocated to one of the two conditions. In the control condition, they read a standard set of 
instructions (equivalent to those in Experiment 1: “On the next pages you will see five 
problems that vary in difficulty. Answer as many as you can.”) In the experimental condition, 
they read a set of instructions designed to trigger analytical processing: “On the next pages 
you will see five problems that vary in difficulty. Answer as many as you can. Please note 
that all five of them are ‘tricky’ problems. So, if you want to solve them correctly you should 
pay close attention to the wording of the questions and reflect on how the problem is trying 
to trick you.” They were then asked to confirm that they had read the instructions by 
answering a multiple-choice question (see Supplementary Materials). If they failed to answer 
correctly, they were asked to read the instructions and the associated multiple-choice 
question again. Only those who selected the correct response (“Based on the instructions I 
have just read, the problems I am going to solve are: a/ tricky problems that require my full 
attention”) were allowed to proceed. Participants in both conditions then solved five 
problems from the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test (Sirota et al., 2018): the Mary’s father 
problem, the Moses illusion, the electric train problem, the match problem and the widow 
problem. These were presented in a random order for each participant. A summation score 
(ranging from 0 to 5) had an acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = 0.74); higher 
scores indicated more cognitive reflection. Finally, the participants answered socio-
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demographic questions about their age and gender and were debriefed. We conducted the 
study following the ethical standards of the University of Essex Ethics Committee and the 
APA ethical guidelines. We have reported all the experiments, measures, manipulations and 
exclusions. The pre-registration, data set, R code used for analysis and the materials used in 
this research are available on the Open Science Framework: https://osf.io/g65yj/.  
Results and Discussion 
Participants spent more time trying to solve the problems in the experimental 
condition (Mdn = 120.3, IQR = 85.3 seconds) compared with those in the control condition 
(Mdn = 97.0, IQR = 64.8 seconds). The effect was statistically significant, W = 9308, p < .001 
(as pre-registered, a non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test was used due to a high positive 
skewness of the time variable, i.e., +2.3). Thus, the participants who were instructed to be 
analytical spent more time trying to solve the problems, which indicates that the 
manipulation was effective.  
Crucially, participants solved substantially more of the CRT items correctly in the 
experimental condition compared with the control condition (Figure 1). This medium-to-
large effect was statistically significant, t(309) = -5.65, p < .001, d = -0.64. The data provided 
decisive evidence supporting our warning effect hypothesis, BF-0 = 575000 (using a default 
Cauchy prior of 0.707), while robustness analysis found similar results using different 
Cauchy prior widths (BF-0 = 519702 for wide and BF-0 = 428737 for ultra-wide priors). In 
addition, we checked the effect of the explicit instructions to be analytical for each item and 
found significant differences in the predicted direction for every single one (Table 2). Thus, 
as predicted, we confirmed that explicit instructions to be analytical translated into 
improved accuracy (Hypothesis 4). 




Figure 2: Effect of explicit instructions to be analytical (vs. standard instructions) on performance in 
cognitive reflection (the number of correctly solved Verbal CRT problems out of five). 
Note. Horizontal lines represent means, boxes represent 95% confidence intervals, beans 
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Table 2 The effect of explicit instructions to be analytical (vs. standard instructions) on the 
number of correct responses (in %) for each selected problem of the Verbal Cognitive 
Reflection Test. 
 
Correct responses  
(in %) 
 







 χ2 p φ 
Verbal CRT       
   VCRT 1 46.5 68.8  14.97 <.001 0.23 
   VCRT 2 21.7 39.0  10.23 .001 0.19 
   VCRT 3 33.1 50.0  8.44 .004 0.17 
   VCRT 4 33.8 61.7  23.21 <.001 0.28 
   VCRT 5 20.4 39.0  12.01 <.001 0.20 
Note. Given the number of comparisons (n), the critical p-value (p) of the chi-squared test 
(χ2) was adjusted using the Bonferroni adjustment (α = .05/n)—the critical value is p = .01; 
φ indicates the phi-coefficient. 
General Discussion 
In the two experiments reported here, we found additional evidence against the 
hypothesis that a disfluent font increases analytical reasoning that would manifest into 
improved performance in two versions of cognitive reflection tests: the numerical CRT 
(Frederick, 2005; Toplak et al., 2014) and the verbal CRT (Sirota et al., 2018). The null effect 
of the disfluent font on performance in the numerical Cognitive Reflection Test contrasts 
with the original findings (Alter et al., 2007), but it is aligned with the reported results from 
other authors (Meyer et al., 2015; Thompson et al., 2013). Furthermore, the updated meta-
analysis, which included the original study (Alter et al., 2007), 16 additional studies (Meyer et 
al., 2015) and our study (Experiment 1), yielded a close-to-zero estimate of the disfluency 
effect on accuracy and a Bayes factor meta-analysis of these studies allowed us to quantify 
the strength of this evidence as decisive evidence against the effect of disfluency on cognitive 
reflection.  
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We also did not find support for the version of the disfluency hypothesis that 
considers numeracy as a boundary condition of the disfluency effect. According to this 
hypothesis, the effect of disfluency might not translate into higher cognitive reflection 
performance because people also needed to have sufficient numerical skills to benefit from 
increased analytical reasoning. Two pieces of evidence presented here go against this 
hypothesis. First, one would expect the disfluency effect to occur for those with higher 
numerical skills. However, we found no significant interaction of the font manipulation with 
numeracy on cognitive reflection. This is aligned with the evidence that self-reported SAT 
math scores did not moderate the disfluency effect across five different studies (Meyer et al., 
2015). Our results extend these findings as we measured numeracy objectively. Second, one 
would expect the disfluency effect to occur for the problems that do not require numerical 
skills, as reaching the correct solution here would be easier once people inhibit their 
intuition and adopt a more analytical approach. However, we only found evidence against 
the disfluency effect on performance in the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test (Sirota et al., 
2018). This is despite the fact that enhanced analytical processing induced by an explicit 
warning about the tricky nature of the problem increased accuracy on selected Verbal CRT 
problems in Experiment 2. This further undermines the idea that a lack of numeracy 
explains the absence of the disfluency effect, since one does not require numerical skills to 
answer these items. Finally, our results with the Verbal CRT also add more weight to the 
disconfirming evidence that a disfluent font activates analytical processing in the non-
numerical problems requiring deliberation such as belief bias syllogism or oversight 
problems (Meyer et al., 2015; Morsanyi & Handley, 2012; Thompson et al., 2013).  
Taken together, our results indicate that a disfluent font does not trigger analytical 
processing when solving cognitive reflection problems (Alter et al., 2007). A statistical 
variation can account for the fact that the original study reported a significant effect on CRT 
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problems. As noted by Meyer et al. (2015), the disfluency effect was driven by unusually low 
performance in the control, fluent condition for the “widgets problem”; the rest of the 
problems had very similar performances across the conditions. This, in combination with 
very small samples used in the original research (20 participants per condition), can account 
for the discrepancy between the original study and the remaining 17 studies trying to 
replicate the finding. Although such an explanation seems the most parsimonious, we should 
also consider alternative explanations. The most obvious one is that solving problems 
featured in either of the cognitive reflection tests does not require extensive analytical 
processing. Supporting this possibility, recent evidence coming from thinking aloud 
protocols and dual-response paradigms indicates that most of the participants who 
answered the CRT problems correctly provided the answers relatively quickly and without 
extensive corrective deliberation (Bago & De Neys, 2019; Szaszi, Szollosi, Palfi, & Aczel, 
2017). This could mean that a disfluent font perhaps activated analytical processing, but that 
this was not required to solve the problems. However, we observed that instructing 
participants to be analytical substantially increased the accuracy of the Verbal CRT 
problems. Besides, if analytical processing was not required, then disfluency should not have 
affected cognitive reflection performance in the original study either. Hence, regardless of 
whether the CRT requires extensive analytical reasoning or not, one needs to assume that 
the original study reported a false-positive finding (Alter et al., 2007).  
Several limitations of our research deserve more attention here. First, our study was 
not an exact replication of the original study, because it included an additional CRT 
problem. While we used the same font manipulation as in the original research with an 
effective manipulation check, we cannot exclude the possibility that presenting more items is 
eroding the disfluency effect. One could counter-argue, however, that longer exposure to a 
disfluent font (via an increased number of written materials) should activate a stronger—not 
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a weaker—effect. One would also expect at least some disfluency effect on the first set of 
items since the order of the items within each instrument was fixed. This was not the case 
here. Second, our sample consisted of undergraduate psychology students who performed 
substantially lower in the Cognitive Reflection Test than the students of Princeton 
University participating in the original research. Finally, although we showed that the fluency 
manipulation was effective and the Verbal CRT measure was sensitive to explicit analytical 
instructions, further positive controls for the Numerical CRT will be needed.  
To summarise, we found several pieces of evidence against the hypothesis that a 
disfluent font activates analytical processing that would, in turn, increase the solution rate of 
the mathematical problems used in the Cognitive Reflection Test. Such a disfluency effect 
was not moderated by numeracy since it was absent from the performance of people with 
lower as well as higher numerical ability. Finally, the disfluent font did not increase the 
solution rate of the non-mathematical and easier problems used in the Verbal Cognitive 
Reflection Test. The evidence presented here, along with prior failed replications, 
corroborates the null effect of disfluent fonts on cognitive reflection. 
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Materials used in ‘Pretest’ 
Manipulation check questions 


































Note. Example text A and B were represented either in the fluent or the disfluent font of 
the materials described below. The order of the example texts was counterbalanced. 
 
  




Materials used in ‘Experiment 1’ 
 
Numerical Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014) 
Instructions 
You will see on the next pages several items that vary in difficulty. Answer as many as you 
can. Please solve the problems in the order they are presented. 
 
Items  
1. A bat and a ball cost £1.10 in total. The bat costs £1.00 more than the ball. How much 




2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines 




3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 
days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover 




4. If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one barrel of water in 




5. Jerry received both the 15th highest and the 15th lowest mark in the class. How many 








6. A man buys a pig for £60, sells it for £70, buys it back for £80, and sells it finally for £90. 




7. Simon decided to invest £8,000 in the stock market one day early in2008.  Six months 
after he invested, on July 17, the stocks he had purchased were down 50%. Fortunately for 
Simon, from July 17 to October 17, the stocks he had purchased went up 75%. At this point, 
Simon has: 
 a) broken even in the stock market 
 b) is ahead of where he began 
 c) has lost money 
 
 
Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test (Sirota, Kostovičová, Juanchich, Dewberry, & Marshall, 2018) 
Instructions 
You will see on the next pages several items that vary in difficulty. Answer as many as you 
can. Please solve the problems in the order they are presented. 
 
Items 
1. Mary’s father has 5 daughters but no sons – Nana, Nene, Nini, Nono. What is the fifth 




2. If you were running a race, and you passed the person in 2nd place, what place would you 




3. It's a stormy night and a plane takes off from JFK airport in New York. The storm 
worsens, and the plane crashes - half lands in the United States, the other half lands in 




4. A monkey, a squirrel, and a bird are racing to the top of a coconut tree. Who will get the 




5. In a one-story pink house, there was a pink person, a pink cat, a pink fish, a pink 




computer, a pink chair, a pink table, a pink telephone, a pink shower– everything was pink! 








7. The wind blows west. An electric train runs east. In which cardinal direction does the 




8. If you have only one match and you walk into a dark room where there is an oil lamp, a 














Note. Participants solved the word problems from the Numerical Cognitive Reflection Test 
and the Verbal Cognitive Reflection Test (counterbalanced for presentation order) either in 
a fluent, easy-to-read font (i.e., black Myriad Web 12-point font) or in a disfluent, difficult-
to-read font (i.e., 10% gray italicised Myriad Web 10-point font). The presentation order of 
the word problems themselves was fixed and presented as shown above. 
  




Numeracy Scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) 
1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 roles, how many 
times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? 
………………….. 
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is your 
best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each by a single 
ticket to BIG BUCKS? 
………………….. 
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a car is 1 in 1,000. 
What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car? 
………………….. 
4. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease? 
 1 in 100 
 1 in 1000 
 1 in 10 
 





6. If Person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B’s risk is double that 
of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
………………….. 
7. If Person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B’s risk is 
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? 
………………….. 
8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people out of 100 would be expected 
to get the disease? 
………………….. 
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people out of 1000 would be 
expected to get the disease? 
………………….. 




10. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a 
____% chance of getting the disease. 
………………….. 
11. The chance of getting a viral infection is .0005. Out of 10,000 people, about how many 




What is your age? ____ years 
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Materials used in ‘Experiment 2’ 
 
Standard instructions 




On the next pages you will see five problems that vary in difficulty. Answer as many as you 
can.   
 
Please note that all five of them are "tricky" problems. So, if you want to solve 
them correctly you should pay close attention to the wording of the questions 
and reflect on how the problem is trying to trick you.   
 
Reading check question 
Based on the instructions I have just read, the problems I am going to solve are: 
 tricky problems that require my full attention  
 not tricky problems that I can answer quickly  
 problems about which it is impossible to say whether they are tricky or not based 
on the instructions  
 
Problems 
Mary’s father has 5 daughters but no sons – Nana, Nene, Nini, Nono. What is the fifth 
daughter's name probably? 
How many of each animal did Moses put on the ark? 
The wind blows west. An electric train runs east. In which cardinal direction does the 
smoke from the locomotive blow? 
If you have only one match and you walk into a dark room where there is  an oil lamp, a 
newspaper and wood - which thing would you light first? 
Would it be ethical for a man to marry the sister of his widow? 
  






What is your age? 
What is your gender? 
 Male  
 Female  
 Other  
 
 
 
